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Do NSW State Significant Developments ever get Refused?

SSD-79276958 – Heritage houses (shaded) being dwarfed by Approved SSD developments

NSW communities are increasingly seeing State Significant Developments (SSD) popping up in their backyards as the NSW Government attempts to hit enormous federal housing targets. As a citizen, it takes a huge effort to read all the documentation that is submitted and respond effectively. Even reconciling one document with another (e.g. architectural plans with number of stories) takes time and often leads to significant inconsistencies being surfaced.

So, is it worth the time? Does the NSW Government actually listen to these submissions?

SSD applications determined
1,334
2006–2026
Approved, incl. with conditions
98.5%
1,304 of 1,324 published decisions
Refused
1.5%
20 of 1,324 published decisions

Decision breakdown — all years

All 1,334 determined NSW State Significant Development applications, by decision.

Approved: 1,274 (95.5%)95.5%Approved With Conditions: 30 (2.2%)Refused: 20 (1.5%)Not published: 10 (0.7%)Not published10 · 0.7%Refused20 · 1.5%Approved With Conditions30 · 2.2%
  • Approved1,27495.5%
  • Approved With Conditions302.2%
  • Refused201.5%
  • Not published100.7%

Decision mix by calendar year

Share of each year’s determinations. The number at the right of each bar is that year’s total.

0%25%50%75%100%2006 — Approved: 13 (100.0%)2006132007 — Approved: 23 (100.0%)2007232008 — Approved: 26 (100.0%)2008262009 — Approved: 40 (97.6%)2009 — Refused: 1 (2.4%)2009412010 — Approved: 34 (100.0%)2010342011 — Approved: 32 (97.0%)2011 — Refused: 1 (3.0%)2011332012 — Approved: 24 (75.0%)2012 — Approved With Conditions: 8 (25.0%)2012322013 — Approved: 12 (48.0%)2013 — Approved With Conditions: 13 (52.0%)2013252014 — Approved: 29 (85.3%)2014 — Approved With Conditions: 5 (14.7%)2014342015 — Approved: 59 (98.3%)2015 — Approved With Conditions: 1 (1.7%)2015602016 — Approved: 67 (100.0%)2016672017 — Approved: 68 (95.8%)2017 — Refused: 3 (4.2%)2017712018 — Approved: 73 (97.3%)2018 — Refused: 2 (2.7%)2018752019 — Approved: 84 (98.8%)2019 — Refused: 1 (1.2%)2019852020 — Approved: 105 (99.1%)2020 — Refused: 1 (0.9%)20201062021 — Approved: 90 (95.7%)2021 — Approved With Conditions: 1 (1.1%)2021 — Refused: 3 (3.2%)2021942022 — Approved: 64 (98.5%)2022 — Refused: 1 (1.5%)2022652023 — Approved: 78 (98.7%)2023 — Refused: 1 (1.3%)2023792024 — Approved: 86 (100.0%)2024862025 — Approved: 129 (98.5%)2025 — Refused: 2 (1.5%)20251312026 — Approved: 109 (100.0%)2026109

The numbers

YearApprovedApproved With ConditionsRefusedNot publishedTotal
20061300013
20072300023
20082600026
20094001041
20103400034
20113201033
20122480032
201312130025
20142950034
20155910060
20166700067
20176803071
20187302075
20198401085
2020105010106
20219013094
20226401065
20237801079
20248600086
2025129020131
2026109000109
All years1,2743020101,334

Source: NSW Planning Portal major projects register, filtered to case stage “Determination” and case type “State Significant Development”. Data retrieved 2026-07-31. Modifications, State Significant Infrastructure and Part3A cases are excluded. 45 determinations publish no determination date, so they are counted in the totals but belong to no calendar year — the year rows sum to 1,289. 10 publish no decision value.

The answer is no – they get approved without consideration of community submissions.

As an example, SSD-79276958 at 59-63 Trafalgar Avenue 1A&1B Valley Road Lindfield. 225 submissions were received, of which 221 objected, 3 were comments and 1 supported. Suspiciously the 1 supporting comment was arguing that the carparking was excessive and would cost the developer too much to deliver.Largely the objections were building height and the resulting shadowing, character and privacy issues. So what did the Minister for Planning and Public Spaces decide to do?

They removed parking, suggested hiding overheight plant and equipment away from the building edges, and installing planter boxes on the balcony for improved privacy.

After 98.2% of the community objected to the development,the NSW Government not only approved, but proactively improved developer margins, for this development.

Investigations continue.

Leading Product through COVID-19

Last week Liam invited me to participate in a webinar titled “Pivoting Product and Product teams through a Crisis”. It was a real honour to be invited, as the panel was made up of a number of great product leaders from Sydney. Mable in particular has seen some big swings in supply and demand, as well as winning a very exciting Department of Health contract.

If you’d like to view the webinar, please see this YouTube video:

Pivoting Product and Product teams through a Crisis
Pivoting Product and Product teams through a Crisis

NBN Fibre vs MTM comparison

Many people feel that a National Broadband Network is a recent, poorly thought through and unnecessary initiative. The reality is that the Australian Government has had a litany of national broadband plans over the last 12 years. Failed tenders occurred in 2003 (Government – Liberal), 2005 (Private – Telstra), 2006 (Private Optus/Elders + Government – Liberal), 2007 (Government – Labor) before finally in 2009 Labor founded NBNCo to build a Fibre to the Premises (FTTP) network. The demand and planning has evolved exponentially over this time period.

The question therefore is (and has been for 12 years) not if we need a National Broadband Network, but which method is the best? Side by side, you can see that the original NBN plan went through a number of revisions over the years, and also see it presented alongside the new MTM plan produced by the current Australian Government:

2012-15 2013-16 (v12) 2013-16 (v13)(Last NBN revision) 2014-17(First MTM plan, post 2013 election)
Revenues to CY2021 AU$23.1b AU$21.7b AU$19.4b AU$18b
Total capital expenditure AU$37.4b AU$37.4b AU$37.4b AU$30b
Total premises covered 13.176m 13.176m 13.274m Not specified
Total premises activated 8.286m 8.757m 8.788m Not specified
Opex to CY2021 AU$26.4b AU$26.4b AU$26.9b AU$27b
Funding: Government equity AU$30.4b AU$30.4b AU$30.4b AU$29.5b
Funding: Debt AU$13.7b AU$15.2b AU$13.8b AU$12b
IRR 7.1% 7.1% 7.1% 3.2%-5.4%
Rollout method FttP Build drop FttP (NBN 2.0) Build drop FttP (NBN 2.1) MTM
Total premises passed by end FY2015 3.664m 3.202m 2.507m 1.093m
Average Download Speed 100Mbps 100Mbps 100Mbps 46Mbps

From ZDNet

Overall the maths and tradeoff is fairly clear, a 20% reduction in cost (capex reduction of $7.4b) results in a 54% reduction in speed. Of course given the current economic pressures this can be seen as a necessary evil, despite the significant deterioration in cost benefit.

There are two hidden factors that make this seemingly simple tradeoff more painful:

 

1) Copper produces incredible variations in connection speed

 

MTM speed estimates for Woy Woy, NSW

MTM speed estimates for Woy Woy, NSW

Full transparency, I work for YouTube. We are a service that is greatly affected by variable connection speeds, but we are not alone: Netflix, Pandora, Spotify, Quickflix etc. are all impacted. When someone like Netflix or Apple looks to bring a service to Australia, consistency of service delivery is an absolute requirement. It took Netflix 7 years before they would launch in Australia. If Netflix can’t justify launching in Australia, how can a start-up every achieve scale within the already small pool of Australian connections? It’s not possible, and moving overseas quickly becomes the obvious solution. To the right is a graph of what connection speeds will look like in one of the cherry picked MTM trial sites in Woy Woy, NSW. This doesn’t even take into account variations in speed due to weather, something copper is prone to. The fibre NBN on the other hand delivers almost uniform consistency across the country at all times.

 

2) Copper costs $1b a year to maintain (as of 2014, the government’s problem)

 

Copper lines are a very expensive asset that is rapidly declining in value. In the original NBN deal the copper was not included, instead NBN only got access to ducts and would pay Telstra as lines were decommissioned – a way to link pit remediation to Telstra’s financial incentives. Under the new MTM deal with Telstra signed in December 2014 there was almost no change, except that the copper was given by Telstra to the Government for $0 extra. Of course the devil in the detail is that the copper network currently comes with a $1b annual maintenance bill. If the government now needs to take over this maintenance bill, and rework the entire Telstra HFC network, who could they turn to for help? Of course Telstra will win the majority of this contract, they know the infrastructure better than anyone and are already winning 50% of the new contracts the NBN is handing out post-deal. That’s why I bought shares in Telstra.

 

So in conclusion, what’s the real trade-off?

 

The $7.4b capex reduction from the MTM to 2021 is neatly replaced by 7 years worth of copper maintenance at $1b a year. Even if it’s slightly less then $1b, the overall benefit at 2021 will be less than $1b in savings for a 54% decline in speed.

This also completely ignores the facts that the NBN fibre network will have lower ongoing maintenance costs, power costs, has near complete speed uniformity across the network, delivers a 2%+ higher IRR for the government and will be upgraded to 10x (1000Mbps) speed for absolute minimum cost.

Unfortunately in modern politics is seems anything beyond a 4 year term is irrelevant to the debate, and instead the focus is on what can be delivered as cheaply as possible before the next election on or before Jan 2017. That’s about the only time in history where the MTM will look even marginally better.

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